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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF, AND
BARRIERS TO, THE RIGHT TO KNOW
LEON R. YANKWICH*

"Accordingly, if man's ultimate happiness does not consist of
external things, which are called goods of fortune; nor in goods
of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the intellectual
part, in terms of the life of moral virtue; nor in terms of the
intellectual virtues which are concerned with action, namely art
and prudence; it remains for us to conclude that man's ultimate
happiness consists in the contemplation of truth." (St. Thomas
Aquinas, ed. Pegis, 1945, Vol. II, pp. 59-60.)
A consideration of the legal implications and barriers of the right
to know requires a statement of certain ethical principles in the light of
which the discussion must proceed. This discussion is a part of an
inquiry into the problem of "communication in a pluralistic world," back
of which is the philosophy expressed by Gabriel Marcel,--the relationship between "the I and thou" (le moi et l'autre) in the manner of
communicating ideas or information. Marcel has emphasized the concept of personality as implying responsibilitynot only to oneself but to
others. As he has put it subjectively,
"I recognize my responsibility jointly to myself and to the other
and that this conjoining is so characteristic of a personal undertaking (engagement) that it is the very mark of personality."'
I
ETHICS AND DEMOCRACY

In discussing the problem, it is important to bear in mind the dual
approach, (a) the point of view of the communicator or transmitter
and (b) that of the person to whom the communication goes. At the
outset, we are confronted with the problem of definition. If we dealt
with mechanical transmitters, we could define information as the transmission of a fact or facts from one person to another. But as the means
is the individual mind, information takes on a personal tinge. Except
when transmitting mathematical facts, the transmitter coordinates and
classifies them. So information ceases to be a static, mechanical act. It
becomes a personal, dynamic act. In a sense, all information is a bit of
life "seen through a temperament." 2
*Author of Numerous Books; Judge, U.S. District Court, Southern District
of California, 1935; Chief Justice since 1951.
'Gabriel
Marcel, Homo VIATOR (1947) p. 26.
2

Leon Brillouin: "Science et Information," 31 N. NouVELLE REVUE
July, 1955, p. 55.
Another student of the problem has stated that

FRANcAiSE,
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So we are back to the problem of responsibility. For democracy
implies responsibility of one to the other and of those who govern to
the community. It springs from a belief in the worth of the individual.
When asked to expound the meaning of the new doctrine, Paul gave as
its essence:
" God that made the world and all things therein,

. .

.giveth to

all life, and breath, and all things;
"And hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on
all the face of the earth ....

In his epistle to the Gallatians, he states the universalism of brotherhood
in the famous sentence:
"There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free,
there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ
Jesus.
are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs
"And if ye be Christ's, then
4
according to the promise."
These go back to Christ's own words, characterizing the true Christians
as "Children of God ' 5 made "equal to us." 6 This is the answer to Malachi's, "Have we not all one father? hath not one God created us ?"1
Because it is based on this belief in the worth and trust of the individual,
democracy postulates voluntary assent as the foundation for government. By contrast, authoritarian government's distrust the individual.
They seek to shackle the human mind. And one of the means of achieving this end is the withholding of information.
In English history the movement against secrecy of the proceedings
in Parliament was a part of the struggle for greater constitutional
"... the selection of a fact is an implicit expression of opinion"
and has defined "information" as
"... a detached presentation of materials capable of use by anybody in
the formation of an opinion." Rene Maheu, "The Right to Information
and the Right to the Expression of Opinion," in HUMAN RIGHTS, A
symposium edited by UNESCO, p. 219, 1949 (Emphasis added)
Cf. -mile Zola's definition of a work of art:
"II est certain qu'une oeuvre ne sera jamais qu'un coin de la nature vu
a travers un temperament." (One thing is certain that a work of art
will always be a corner of life seen through an individual temperament.)
(smile Zola, "Le Naturalisme au Theatre," in LE ROMAN EXPERIMENTAL,
nouvelle edition, p. 111 (1923).
317 Acts: 24-27.
43 Galatians: 28-29.
5 20 Luke: 36.
6 20 Matthew: 12.
72 Malachi: 10. In a brief sentence, attributed to the great French poet
Alphonse de Lamartine, the ethical implications of freedom are epitomized:
"La libertg est plus que l'esprit humain: C'est la conscience humaine."
(Liberty transcends the human spirit: It is the very conscience of man.)
(Quoted in John Lord O'Brian, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDMDUAL
FREEDOM, p. 76, Note 17, 1955)
It is attributed to Lamartine in G. E. Fassnacht, AcToN's POLITICAL PHILOSoPHY, p,200, 1952.
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freedom begun during the reign of William and Mary. Macaulay has
commented:
"It never occurred to any one of these who were zealous for the
Triennial Bill that every argument which could be urged in
favour of that bill was an argument against the rules which had
been framed in old times for the purpose of keeping parliamentary deliberations and divisions strictly secret. It is quite natural
that a government which withholds political privileges from the
commonalty should withhold also political information. But nothing can be more irrational that to give power, and not to give the
knowledge without which there is the greatest risk that power
will be abused. What could be more absurd than to call constituent bodies frequently together that they might decide whether
their representative had done his duty by them, and yet strictly
to interdict them from learning, on trustworthy authority, what
he had said or how he had voted ?""
The right to publish the debates of Parliament was not established
until 1771 and 1772. And, says Buckle,
".... for the first time the people were able to study the proceedings of the national legislature, and thus gain some acquaintance
with national affairs."9
This came as the result of the long struggle begun early in the eighteenth
century between the rising English free press and the two houses of
Parliament. George III opposed "this extention of popular rights." In
1771, he wrote to Lord North:
"It is highly necessary that this strange and lawless method of
publishing debates in the papers should be put a stop to." 10
But neither he, nor the entrenched aristocracy of Parliament could stem
the democratic movement. The American colonies reflected the spirit
of this revolution. Leaders like Edward Livingston, Patrick Henry
and James Madison asserted the right to free flow of information concerning public matters and condemned secrecy in governmental affairs
as inimical to free government."
8 Thomas Babington MacCaulay, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND,

(Am. Ed. Vol.
IV) p. 248, 1856. The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in an unanimous opinion, has stated:
"The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe
to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and
business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity;
and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity
afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave
concern." (Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 1936)
(Emphasis added)
9 Henry Thomas Buckle, HISTORY OF CIvIuzAuiol, World Classics pocket
edition, Vol. I, p. 351, 1911.
Ibid., loc. cit., p. 401. See, Frederick Seaton Siebert, FmoM OF THE PRESS
IN ENGLAND, pp. 230, 246-273, 1952.
n Edward Livingston was emphatic:
"No nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too close an inspection
into the conduct of its officers, but many have been brought to ruin, and

10

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Rightly. Because the right of a free community to the free flow of
information is paramount. Governmental activities do not allow differentiation between what is private and what is public. All the business
which persons in public office, high or low, perform is of a public nature.
So there is no conflict, as in the case of privacy, between individual
rights and the public's demands,-but rather between the right of the
public to be informed and the arrogative right of persons in public
office to withhold the information.
II
KNOWLEDGE AND

FREE GOVERNMENT

The adoption in the Federal and State Constitutions of the guarantee
of freedom of speech and press and of the other democratic rights led
to the recognition of the right of access and publication of the activities
of public men and public bodies. At the present time, the right of the
people to have information as the activities of persons chosen in a
democratic way is thoroughly established and cannot be challenged.
With the development of what we call "mass civilization," there has
been a great increase in the number and variety of media of communication, which play an important part in the education of everyone living in a democratic society. And if they are to perform their
proper function in our society, there must be a free flow of information towards them which they, in turn, are, in duty bound, to communicate to the public.
In sum, secrecy breeds irresponsibility and tyranny. The right to
know is implicit in the democratic idea of responsibility of those who
govern. And the right to circulate information is a part of the guaranty of free speech. 12 Nothwithstanding this, at all levels of government there have been attempts, in recent years, to deny access to the
activities of public men and bodies to such an extent that the American Society of Newspaper Editors sponsored the research which resulted in the publication in 1953 of a book showing the extent to
which access to activities of public men and to public records and
proceedings is being denied.13 It appears from this publication that

12
13

reduced to slavery, by suffering gradual imposition and abuses, which
were imperceptible, only because the means of publicity had not been
secured." (Edward Livingston, WORKS, Vol. I, p. 15)
Patrick Henry stated in the constitutional convention that
"... to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an
abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man and every friend to his
country." (ELLIOTr'S DEBATES, Vol. III, p. 170)
For Madison's views, see Note 105, infra.
People v. Armentrout, 118 C.A. (Supp.) 761, 769-771, (1931); Lovell v.
Village of Euclid, 303 U.S. 444, 452, (1938).
Harold L. Cross, THE PEOPLE's RIGHT TO KNOW, 1953. Since this article was
prepared a book dealing with the evils of news suppression and propaganda
has been published by the former Chief Executive of the Associated Press.
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in thirty-two states legislative sessions must be open with certain
exceptions. Two states, Idaho and New Mexico, require open sessions
at all times. In fourteen states there is no statutory access provided
but by custom and public opinion, the right is recognized. However,
these provisions do not seem to apply to the sessions of legislative
committees which determine whether their sessions shall be open or
secret. As is well known, the United States Senate and the House
of Representatives determine which of their sessions shall be public.
And, because there has been, in late years, dissatisfaction with the
manner in which access has been denied upon one ground or another,
the problem has become very urgent.
III
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A. The Right to a Public Trial. Before discussing further the
problem as it relates to executive, legislative and administrative bodies,
it is well to state that, subject to a limited rule of exclusion of certain
members of the public, the right of the public to access of judicial
proceedings of a criminal nature is absolute. The Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States guarantees to a person
accused
"... the right to a speedy and public trial."'14
The right to a public trial was established in English common law
although scholars are not in agreement as to the date. Recognition of
the right of public trial in both civil and criminal cases is found in
English law writers in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries.' 5
Blackstone referred to it as one of the excellencies of the common
law system.16 Forty-one state constitutions recognize the right in
criminal cases.
Whenever the question has arisen in criminal cases, the federal
courts have held the denial of a public trial to be a denial of due
process.17 The cases are not in accord as to the nature of the right.
See, Kent Cooper, THE RIGHT TO KNOW, AN ExPosTIoN OF THE EVILS OF
NEws SUPPRESSION AND PROPAGANDA, (1956).
14U.S. CONST. AMEND.

VI.

15 Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMPLE LAw REV. 381, (1930).
16 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES III, c. 23, II p. 375, (Jones' ed.) p. 1983.
17 Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488, (9th Cir. 1913) ; Davis v. United States,

247 F. 294, (8th Cir. 1917) ; Hodge v. United States, 13 F.2d 596, (6th Cir.
1926) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-278, (1948) ; Tanksley v. United States,
145 F.2d 58, (9th Cir. 1944); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d '922, 3rd Cir.
1949). Generally speaking, the federal constitutional guarantees as to trials
have been held not to apply to state prosecutions, Games v. Washington,
277 U.S. 81, 1928; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288, (1947). However, later
cases consider the guarantee of a public trial as a part of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-272, 1948. All
states provide for public trials either by constitutional or statutory provisions. See, 14 Am. JuR., CaMINAL LAW, §§139-143.
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Some of the earlier cases take the view that the right is not absolute.'
Later cases hold the right to be absolute, especially if the exclusion
is not limited to immature persons in certain types of cases, but is
applied to the public in general.
A federal case from the Ninth Circuit, already referred to, has
stated the ground against general exclusion:
"After mature consideration we have reached the conclusion,
in accord with the present views of the two United States
Courts of Appeals which have passed upon the precise question,
that the Sixth Amendment precludes the general indiscriminate
exclusion of the public from the trial of a criminal case in a
federal court over the objection of the defendant and limits the
trial judge to the exclusion of those persons or classes of persons
only whose particular exclusion is justified by lack of space or
for reasons particularly applicable to them."' 9
A New York State case which, in recent years, attracted nationwide attention reached a similar conclusion. There, in a criminal
prosecution for compulsory prostitution, the court excluded the public
generally, including the press. On appeal the highest court of New
York held this to be denial of a public trial guaranteed by the law of
New York. 20

The Court used this language:

"The public trial concept has, however, never been viewed as imposing a rigid inflexible straightjacket on the courts .... Accord-

ingly, it is recognized that the court may limit the number of spectators in the interests of health or for sanitary reasons or in order
to prevent overcrowding or disorder.. . . It is also recognized
that the court may temporarily exclude spectators, where necessary to enable an immature or emotionally disturbed witness
to testify....
"The authority thus residing in the trial court must be acknowledged as an implicit qualification of the general rule of openness
of judicial proceedings,..., notwithstanding the wording of the
Judiciary Law section. .

.

. Section 4 undoubtedly has the

effect of extending the guarantee of public trial to all cases,
whether civil or criminal, with the exceptions there set forth.
But, beyond that, it presumably does no more than to reaffirm
in terms of general application the principle of publicity in
judicial proceedings, subject to the qualifications inherent
therein." 2 1 (Emphasis added)

But while the New York court held the order of general exclusion
to be a denial of a constitutional right guaranteed to the defendant,
in an action instituted by one of the press associations against the
18 Davis v. United States, supra, note 17; Reagan v. United States, supra,

note 17.
States v. Kobli, supra, note 17, 922, 923.
.CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §8; N. Y.

'9 United
20N. Y

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW,

N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW, §4.
21 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772, (1954).

§12;
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Judge presiding at the trial to compel him to rescind the Order, the
court held that the guarantee of a public trial is not one which could
be enforced by the public. The decision was by divided court,
the majority opinion written by Judge Fuld, being concurred in only
by two judges. A third judge concurred in the result in a separate
opinion. There was a strong dissent by Judge Froessel, concurred in
by Judge Dye, in which it was insisted that the guarantee created a
right in the public which they could enforce, independently of the
defendant:
"Since the public may attend court sittings, how may their right
be enforced in the case of an invalid exclusion? Why may not
representatives of the press as members of the public at large
do precisely what they did here, and thus test the public right?
They are neither meddlers nor outsiders, interfering with or
injecting themselves into the conduct of a trial, nor do they seek
to control the course of the proceedings. They seek to report
what they are entitled to 'see, behold and hear.' If they transgress beyond the pale of the law, they lose the privilege granted
them under section 337 of the CIVIL PRAcTIcE ACT and are
answerable for violation of the PENAL LAW (see arts. 106,
126) ."22
Federal rules and state constitutional or statutory provisions extend
the guarantee of public trial to civil cases. Subject to the right of the
court to limit attendance in certain types of cases, the trial of a civil
law suit is considered public business, to be conducted openly "for
23
all to see."
B. Reports of Judicial Proceedings. The
to trials in civil and criminal cases implies the
ing it, including newspaper representatives,
reports of the proceedings. Under the view

right of public access
right of persons attendto make fair and true
expressed by the Court

22 United Press Association v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777, 789, (1954).
2353 Am. Ju., TRALk §26; 88 C.J.S., TRAL., §28-40; CAL. CODE oF Civ. PROCEDURE,
§124; Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266, 77 A.2d 183, 184, (1940);
Maduro v. Maduro, 62 C.A.2d 776; 779, 145 P.2d 683, (1944); Wiedenhaupt
v. Hoelzel, 254 Wis. 39, 35 N.W.2d 207, 209, (1948); Rea v. Rea, 195 Ore.,

252, 245 P2d 884, (1952). As to exclusion of witnesses in divorce, criminal
conversation and similar cases, see, e.g., CAL. CODE OF CiV. PROC. §125. For
permissive secrecy as to other judicial and non-judicial proceedings, see
statutory references in Notes 64-78, infra. As to Federal Courts, the rules
provide that "all (civil) trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open
court." (Rule 77(b), FED. RULEs OF CIV. PRoc.)
The right of the public is recognized by students of the problem. Radin
states:
"Is it a fact that there is a public right to see how justice is done? I
think there should be one, and there is no reason why the court should
not create it." (Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 1932, 6 TEMPLE
LAW Q., 381, 392)
It is implicit in the language of one of the cases cited that

"... the trial of a law suit is public business usually to be conducted openly
for all to see." (See Palestroni v. Jacobs, supra)
And see cases in Note 39, infra.
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of Appeals of New York24 this right would be rendered illusory because an exclusion of newspapers would make it impossible for them
to report proceedings except through the relayed reports of others.
Most of the states specifically recognize the publication of fair and
true reports in a public journal of judicial proceedings. Illustrative is
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE, Section 47, subdivision 4.
The statutes of Wisconsin specifically provide:
"The proprietor, publisher, editor, writer or reporter upon any
newspaper published in this state shall not be liable in any civil
action for libel for the publication in such newspaper of a true
and fair report of any judicial, .

law."25

.

. proceeding authorized by

The question has arisen whether pleadings or complaints filed with
a court clerk and which have not yet been read in open court or have
been the subject of some judicial act are covered by this privilege.
The older cases made the distinction between a complaint and a judicial
proceeding, 26 even holding that the qualified privilege of publication
applied only to proceedings on the merits, and hearings in open court.
But this rule has been modified and the privilege now attaches to
reports of ex parte and preliminary proceedings. Under it a fair
report of the charges made in a bill of equity which has been presented
to the court, and upon which the court has acted by making an order
that the defendants appear and show cause why an injunction should
27
not issue against them is privileged.
Hence, the issuance of an order to show cause re alimony makes
the publication of the contents of the complaint in an action for divorce
qualifiedly privileged. However, the present tendency in some courts
is to consider a complaint, which is the startingpoint, a part of judicial
proceeding. Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals of
28
New York have so held.
A New York woman brought suit against a newspaper for the
publication of a news item which referred to the fact that a summons
had been served against her and reciting the alleged facts in the case.
Before the complaint was filed, the proposed suit was settled out of
court. The woman sued for libel, contending that the publication was
24

United Press Association v. Valente, supra, note 22.

(1953) §331.05.
26 Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112 N.W. 258, (1907).
27 PROSSER ON TORTS, p. 624, (2nd ed. 1955) ; 33 Aoii. JuR., LIBEL AND SLANDER,
25 WIS. STATS.

§157; 53 C.J.S., LIBEL AND SLANDER, §127; Metcalf v. Times Publishing Co.,

28

20 R.I. 674; 78 Am. St. Rep. 900, (1898); Lundin v. Post Publishing Co.,
217 Mass. 213, 104 N.E. 480, (1914); Thompson v. Boston Publishing Co.,
285 Mass. 344, 189 N.E. 210, (1934); Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler
Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5, (1945) ; Notes, Privilege of Pleadings,
52 A.L.R. 1438, (1927), 104 A.L.R. 1124, (1936).
Campbell v. New York Evening Post, Inc., 219 N.Y. App. Div. 169, 218 N.Y.S.
446, (1926).
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untrue, that it was false to say that she had been sued when only
summoned and that the publication of news concerning the issuance
of a summons was not privileged.
The New York Court of Appeals held that
cc .a lawsuit, from beginning to end, is in the nature of a
29
judicial proceeding."
When the question came before the California courts in 1935, they
took the same view without any reference to the New York decision.
They determined the privileged character of the pleading by analyzing
the function of the complaint.3"
The plaintiff had been the defendant in an action brought by her
husband in which it was charged that he was not the father of the
son born to his wife. The Los Angeles News published the contents
of the complaint. An action for libel resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the publication was qualifiedly privileged for which no action, absent proof of
malice, lay:
"We hold that a lawsuit from beginning to end is in the nature
of a judicial proceeding, the filing of a complaint being the first step
therein, and that the subsequent pleadings are successive steps
therein. (§405, CODE ov CIVIL PROCEDURE)
"Publication without malice of a truthful report that a charge
has been made in the complaint filed in an action is clearly
within the protection afforded by subdivision 4 of section 47 of
the CIVIL CODE, because the filing of a pleading is a public and
official act in the 'course of judicial proceedings." 31
Because of the requirement that the publication be not only fair
and true but' also without malice the question whether a publication
is privileged, ordinarily, presents a question of fact. However, at
times, the article itself indicates on its face that the report is a fair
and true report and if the complaint does not allege the contrary or
plead malice, it does not state a cause of action. Such a situation
arose in a California case in which a newspaper reported that in a
divorce proceeding a woman has been named a co-respondent, the
article also stating that the Judge trying the case had found the charge
to be untrue. So the ruling which I as a trial judge made that the
29

3

Campbell v. New York Evening Post, Inc., 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153, (1927).
See the interesting comment on this decision by Benjamin N. Cardozo, the
then Chief Judge of the court, in his PARAnoxEs OF LEGAL ScmircE, pp. 23-24,

(1928).

0Kurata v. Los Angeles News Pub. Co., 4 C.A.2d 225, 40 P.2d 520, (1935).
The courts of other states are adopting the same attitude: Lybrand v. State
Co., 179 S.C. 208, 186 S.E. 580, (1936); Fitch v. Daily News Pub. Co., 116

Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947, (1928); Paducah Newspaper Inc., v. Bratcher, 274
Ky. 220, 118 S.W.2d 178, (1938). But the general rule is still against the
existence of the privilege before judicial action on the pleadings. PROSSER,
loc. cit., supra, note 27.
31 Kurata v. Los Angeles News Pub. Co., supra, note 30, p. 227.
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article was both privileged and true on its face was sustained, the
higher court saying:
"The whole case appears to be based not upon the falsity of the
imputation, but upon the untruthfulness of the publication of
the form in which it was made, which led, we think, to the
order of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer without
leave to amend. From what we have stated, the conclusion
is
'32
inescapable that the demurrer was properly sustained.
C. The Problem of Method-"Trial by Newspaper." Granted
the public's interest in judicial proceedings and the right of newspapers to report them, the all-important question still remains, How
shall it be done? With the rapid development of the press in the
English-speaking world and with the greater freedom it enjoyed in
England before the Revolution contrasted with the censorship of Continental European countries, judges and others connected with the
administration of justice began to feel what they designated even then
as "the abuse of the press." In 1770 the great Lord James Mansfield
in reversing the outlawry sentence imposed on John Wilkes, a member
of Parliament, because of certain publications against the Crown,
complained of what he called the mendax infamia of the press and
gave an answer worthy of his greatness:
"The constitution does not allow reasons of State to influence
our judgments: God forbid it should: we must not regard political consequences; how formidable soever they might be: if rebellion was the certain consequence, we are bound to say 'fiat
justitia, ruat caelum' .

..

I will do my duty, unawed. What am

I to fear? that mendax infamia from the press, which daily
coins false facts and false motives? the lies of calumny carry
no terror to me. I trust that my temper of mind, and the colour
and conduct of my life, have given me a suit of armour against
these arrows ....

I will not do that which my conscience tells

me is wrong, upon this occasion; to gain the huzzas of thousands,
or the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press;
I will not avoid doing what I think is right; though it should
32 Mortensen v. Los Angeles Examiner, 112 C.A. 194, 203, 205, 296 Pac. 927,
(1931). Reports of judicial proceedings must be substantially accurate. To
be such they need not be a verbatum report of what took place, but may
consist of a condensed version. However, they should not omit any important
or material fact. 33 AM. JuR., LiBEL AND SLANDER, §154; 53 C.J.S., LIBEL AND
SLANDER, §127; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §611; Sweet v. Post Pub. Co., 215
Mass, 450, 102 N.E. 660, 661, (1913) ; People v. Gordan, 63 C.A. 627, 635, 219
Pac. 496, (1923); Cresson v. Louisville Courier-Journal, 299 F. 487, (6th
Cir. 1924); Times Dispatch Pub. Co. v. Zoll, 148 Va. 850, 139 S.E. 505, 507,
(1927); James v. Powell, 154 Va. 96, 152 S.E. 539, 545, (1930); Kurata v.
Los Angeles News Pub. Co., 4 C.A.2d 224, 228; 40 P.2d 520, (1935). In
reporting judicial and other public proceedings, the press merely reports
and transmits what anyone attending would see and hear. The press is thus
a substitute for the public. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127, 1130,
(1938). See PROSSER ON TORTS, (2nd ed. 1955) p. 623; 6 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, (3rd ed. 1940) §1836.

1956]

THE RIGHT TO KNOW

draw on me the whole artillery of libels; all that falsehood
and malice can invent, or the creduity of a deluded populace
can swallow. I can say, with a great magistrate, upon an occasion
and under circumstances not unlike, 'Ego hoc animo semper
fui, ut invidiam virtute partam, glariam, non invidiam, putarer'." (I was always of this view that I would
consider ill-will
33
bred of virtue as fame, and not as ill-will)
Granted that strong judges can withstand pressure, the fact still
remains that we cannot gauge the prejudicial effect of exaggerated,
truncated and flamboyant reporting of judicial proceedings both as
they relate to what occurs before or after trial. Because of the intense
publicity which had been given to the hearings of a congressional
committee investigating alleged misconduct of the Internal Revenue
Office at Boston, the conviction secured later of the officer in charge
was reversed. The Court of Appeals felt that the wide and biased
publicity given precluded a fair trial and that a continuance should
have been granted until the effect of what the Court called, the
"avalanche of unfavorable publicity" had subsided. 34
The late Mr. Justice Jackson, in an address to the criminal law
section of the American Bar Association, in 1953, expressed the fears
arising from what has come to be known as "trial by newspaper" or
"trial by city desk :"
"We are troubled about the problem of fair trial-because
there is a feeling in some quarters that it's a good thing to bring
to the public prematurely every item of information that can be
dug up to the discredit of an accused.
"Confessions that were excluded by the trial court because they
were obtained by methods that the law could not sanction have
been given out by prosecutors and published and put into the
homes of the jurors by way of radio and even television during
the pendency of the trial." 35
33 Rex v. John Wilkes, K.B. 1770, 4 Burr. 2527, 2562, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 347.
34Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112, (1st Cir. 1952). Mr. Justice
Jackson in his concurring opinion in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51-53,
(1950), took occasion to refer to the grave consequences which follow inflammatory press discussions in advance of trial:
"But prejudicial influences outside the courtroom, becoming all to typical
of a highly publicized trial, were brought to bear on this jury with such
force that the conclusion is inescapable that these defendents were prejudged as guilty and the trial was but a legal pesture to register a verdict
already dictated by the press and the public opinion which it generated...
Newspapers, in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, may not
deprive accused persons of their right to fair trial."
(p. 51-53) (Emphasis added)
And see the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion
in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 359, 365, (1946) ; Simon H. Rifkind,
When the Press Collides With Justice, JouRaN
AL~m.
JuD. Soc., Vol. 34,
No. 2, p.46, (1950).
35Robert H. Jackson, Serving The Administration of Crintnal Justice, 15
F.R.D. 65, 69, (1953). In a noted concurring opinion, justice Jackson has
stated that
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by in-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Some lawyers and judges have advocated the restriction rather
than the enlargement of the right of newspapers and other communication media, which, at the present time, are free to make reports,
subject to the prohibitions of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
CANON 35 and court rules such as Rule 53 of the FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE against photographs, radio and television broadcasting from court rooms.
In January 1954 there was placed before the New York State
Bar a proposed resolution of its Committee on Civil Rights which
urged the New York legislature to make it unlawful, while a criminal
investigation or a criminal charge is pending, for any prosecuting
attorney, counsel for the defense, prosecuting and police officers or
others having official connection with the case to disclose any admissions or statements of the accused person, or any evidence in the
case, prior conviction or any other matter that might pre-judge the
case or prevent a fair trial, unless authorized by an order of the court.
The report which accompanied the resolution stated:
" ..

The danger arises primarily from the fact that however

scrupulously fairness is maintained in the courtroom, publications outside the courtroom may seriously prejudice the parties
and the outcome ..
"These practices smack of that gross departure from our conceptions of fair trial, represented by such institutions as the
Peoples Courts in Communist totalitarian countries. Trial and
conviction by public clamor or on questionable or inadmissable
evidence is the very antithesis of our system of justice. ' 36
The New York State Society of Newspaper Editors, condemned
the resolution in these words:
This proposal would suppress the major news in trials ....
"This would interfere with the people's right to know what is
going on in their courts. It would automatically weaken law
enforcement and increase the opportunities for concealment,
collusion and miscarriage of justice ....

The proposal violates

the constitutional right of the people to know,37 in fullest possible
detail, the action of their public servants."
structions to the jury, cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 322 U.S. 539, 559,
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." (Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, (1948).
36 EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 87, No. 6, February 6, 1954, p. 8. And see, Honorable George H. Boldt, United States District Judge, Western District of
Washington, as quoted in EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 87, No. 35, August 21, 1954,
p. 20.
7 Ibid. And see, Alex F. Jones, as quoted in EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 87, No.
35, August 21, 1954, p. 20. The same editor's address before the New York
State Bar Association at a later meeting that year is given in full in NEw
YORK STATE BAR BULLETIN, Vol. 26, No. 4, July 1954, pp. 202 et seq. The
attitude of the committee was expressed at the same meeting by Mr. Louis
Waldman whose address is at pp. 219 et seq. of the same issue.
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Because of strong opposition from both Bar and press the committee later abandoned the idea of dealing with the matter by legislation. Instead, it made two recommendations to the association at its
June 1954 meeting:
"1. That the New York State Bar Association take appropriate
action looking towards the amendment by the American Bar
Association and by our own Association of Section 20 of the
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, to

condemn as unprofes-

sional press releases and public statements by lawyers, the
publication of which may interfere with a fair trial in the courts
or the due administration of justice.
"2. That the recommendation contained in your Committee's
report submitted to the Association on January 29, 1954 be
referred to the Executive Committee and action thereon be held
in abeyance pending the adoption of the amendment of Section
20 of the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS or until such time
as the Executive Committee may see fit to recommend to the
Association further action thereon."
Resolutions in the wording of these recommendations were adopted
38
with practically no dissenting vote.

The attitudes expressed in the New York controversy
are typical.
Involved is the problem of equating the right to a fair trial with freedom of the press. This is not always easy. The legal profession
stresses the primacy of fair justice; the newspapers would subordinate
it to the right to disclose what is concededly public business by opposing all compulsory secrecy.
An old California contempt case has taken as broad a view of the
right to publish what occurs in a courtroom as is taken generally by
the newspapers at the present time. In that case the Supreme Court
of California in refusing to hold a California attorney guilty of contempt because, contrary to express direction of the Judge, he had told
the press what had occurred during a certain hearing, stated:
I

"In this country it is a first principle that the people have a right

38

to know what is done in their courts .... and the greatest publicity to the acts of those holding positions of public trust, and
NEw YORK STATE BAR BULLETIN, Vol. 26, No. 4, July 1954, p. 225; Letter of
Louis Waldman of the New York Bar to writer dated October 24, 1955.
The writer expresses his indebtedness to Mr. Waldman who supplied the
material from which the outline just given was taken.
CANON 20 OF THE CANONS

OF PROFESSIONAL

proposed to amend now reads:

ETHICs

which the resolution

"20. Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation
"Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trail in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the
due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the
extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the
public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference
to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers
on file in the Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any
ex parte statement."
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the greatest freedom in the discussion of the proceedings of
public tribunals that is consistent with truth and decency are
regarded as essential to the public welfare."3 9
Contentions that the space devoted to crime and criminal activities
in the modern newspaper is greater than in the past lack foundation
in fact. Indeed, such studies as have been made would warrant a
contrary conclusion. 40 However, students, old and new, have condemned the methods which many newspapers use in reporting judicial
proceedings.41 So the main problem still is the manner and content
3 In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 530, (1893). In an earlier case the California
court had taken the view that the guarantee of public trial in 4 criminal
case is for the benefit of the accused only:
"The word public is used in the clause of the Constitution in opposition
to secret. As said by Judge Cooley, it is not meant that every person
who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to attend criminal trials. 'The
requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and
that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triors keenly alive
to a sense of their responsibility, and to the importance of their functions,
and the requirement is fairly observed, if without partiality or favoritism,
a reasonable portion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding
that those persons whose presence would be of no service to the accused,
and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity are excluded
altogether.' (CoNST. LIm. SInE p. 312)" (People v. Swafford, 65 Cal.
223, 224, 3 Pac. 809), (1884) (Emphasis added)
In a later case the California court condemned the exclusion of all the
public in these words:
"The trial should be public in the ordinary common-sense acceptation of
the term. The doors of the courtroom are expected to be kept open,
the public are entitled to be admitted, and the trial is to be public in all
respects, as we have before suggested, with due regard to the size of the
courtroom, the conveniences of the court, the right to exclude objectionable
characters and youth of tender years, and to do other things which may
facilitate the proper conduct of the trial." (People v. Hartman, 103 Cal.
242, 245, 37 Pac. 153), (1894) (Emphasis added)
This ruling has been approved in later California cases: People v. Byrnes,
84 C.A.2d 72, 190 P.2d 290, (1948) ; People v. Terry, 99 C.A.2d 579, 584, 222
40 P.2d 95, (1950). See 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, (3rd ed. 1940) §§1834-1835.
ANN. Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI., Vol. CXXV, No. 214 (May, 1936) pp. 1,
18; EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 61, No. 27, July 7, 1928, p. 18; Ibid., September
15, 1928; Curtis D. MacDougal, 1941, NEws RooM PROBLEMS AND POLICIES,

p. 179. For the view against publication of crime news, as exemplified by the
policy of the Christian Science Monitor, see the article by one of its former
editors, Paul S. Deland, "Crime News," 1947, FEDERAL PROBATION, Vol. 11,
No. 2, p. 4. And see, Negley K. Teeters, "Fundamentals of Crime Prevention," 1946, FEDERAL PROBATION, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 25-30. Except for the
increase brought on by the dislocations which followed every war, while
crime detection and apprehension is on the increase crime commission is
actually on the decrease. The F.B.I. reported a slight decrease in major
crimes of 1% in 1955. Associated Press dispatch, as quoted in Los Angeles
Times, December 31, 1955, Part II A, p. 4.
41 Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv., pp. 193, 196,
(1890). Raymond Moley, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS, p. 93, (1930). And see,
Paul Bellamy, "Why Print Crime News," PROCEEDINGS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
CONFERENCE ON CRIME, p. 86, (1934) ; Stanley Walker, "The Newspaper and
Crime," Ibid, p. 98; Fulton Oursler, "The Opportunities of the Press in the
War Against Crime," Ibid., p. 104; H. V. Kaltenborn, "The Role of Radio
in an Anti-Crime Movement," Ibid., p. 111; Carl E. Milliken, "The Screen's
Contribution to the Prevention of Crime," Ibid., p. 119. And see, Note,
Control of Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 HARV. LAW REV. 840,
842-843, (1950).
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of publication. A good portion of the crime and other court news,
instead of being an accurate and objective report of outstanding facts
is a highly colored report in which, as stated years ago in the, report
of a special committee of the American Bar Association, "the play of
imagination, exaggeration, effusion, distortion, deduction, conjecture,
prediction and all the secondary mental processes (are) often exercised upon the primary physical facts by ingenious reporters." 42
These mental processes, as the Committee suggested, "do havoc to
litigants, courts, the processes of public justice, and inevitably tend
to undermine public confidence in our judicial institutions through
deliberate misrepresentation."
A more recent critic of "trial by newspaper" writes:
"The minds of a jury may be likened to twelve test tubes. What
scientist would commence an experiment with twelve test tubes,
soiled and discolored by the deposits of repeated experiments?
Yet this is precisely the condition of the minds of a jury exposed
to a barrage of pictures, confessions, purported testimony,
theories of the case, and discussions prior to the trial of a
capital 43or colorful felony case, in any American jurisdiction
today."
Disastrous results follow this type of reporting. The impression is
created that we are, from time to time, in the grip of "crime waves."
Danger lurks in "crime-wave psychology" with its unintelligent demand for increased penalties. Many psychologists and criminologists
have stressed the important role played in crime by "the law of imitation." Embellished crime news,-glorification of the criminal,--may,
by the law of imitation, induce criminal activities in highly suggestible
44
or unstable persons, or in persons of low or subnormal intelligence.
The publication before trial and, sometimes, before capture of the
person accused of crime, of all the details of the crime, testimony of
witnesses and of the actions, conclusions, surmises, and theories of the
prosecuting officers, may actually deprive the accused of a fair trial.
The contempt power is too dangerous to use.
The provisions for change of venue because the defendant cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial on account of the prejudice against
him created by the pretrial publicity may help in a particular case. 45
But it does not solve the general problem.
The function of a newspaper of general circulation is to present
42REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION OF PREss AND BAR (Reprint) p. 7.
4sHarold W. Sullivan, CONTEMPs BY PUBLICATION, Foreward VIII, (1941).
44 Negley K. Teeters, Fundamentals of CrirninalProbation, FEDERAL PROBATION,
1946, Vol. X, No. 2, p. 25; Paul W. Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency, 1949, pp.
53-165.

45 Rule 21(a), 22, FEpDEAr RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PRoCEDuRE.

Similar provisions

are contained in state codes. See, e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE, §§1033-1038; Wis.
STAT. (1953) §56.03 (3); 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW, §187, 189-190, 196.
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facts as they occur. The courts are the people's and whatever occurs
in them is a proper subject of report or comment. News, to give a
popular definition, is anything new and interesting. As the newspaper
is not the creator, it should not be the censor of news. It is its right,
nay, its duty, to report crime news and to record crime activities.
So doing, the newspaper performs a public function and may, in some
instances, actually aid in assuring a "fair trial." But there remains
the question: How should this function be performed generally? The
newspapers should be guided by the highest standards of the profession, bearing in mind that an immediate, but ultimately illusory, success
in news-gathering should not outweigh the interests of the community.
The newspapers can aid in the administration of justice by discouraging sensationalism in crime and court news before trial, by
encouraging, in the words of the Bar Association Committee, reports
which,
* . truthfully, fairly, accurately, objectively write down and
and describe in words for publication every
46 emphatic fact which
(a reporter) legitimately sees or hears"
at the trial, and by playing up, in the interest of crime prevention, the
records of conviction in our courts.
Newspapers should observe the admonition given some years ago
by the Associated Press not to
"..

. glorify crime and heroize criminals by giving a false

and thus excite sympathy for a criminal or
glamour to a ' 'case
7
for a crim e.

The American Society of Newspaper Editors, some years ago, evidently convinced of the justness of much of the criticism directed at
newspapers, in a Code stressed the responsibility of the newspaper
in this manner:
"The right of a newspaper to attract and hold readers is restricted by nothing but consideration of public welfare."48 (Emphasis added)
Among the requirements listed for responsible reporting were sincerity, truthfulness, accuracy, impartiality, fair play and decency. With
special reference to handling of crime news, the Code said:
"A newspaper cannot escape conviction of insincerity if, while
professing high moral purpose, it supplies incentive to base conduct, such as are to be found in details of crime and vice, publication of which is not demonstrably for the general good." 4 9
46 Report, supra, note 42, p. 7.
47 EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 61, No. 9, March 3, 1928, pp. 5, 71.
4S Quoted in Paul S. Deland, Crime News, FEDERAL PROBATION, 1947, Vol. 11,
No. 2; See, Joseph L. Holmes, Crime and the Press, 1929, 20 JOURNAL OF
CR. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 6-59.
49Ibid.
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On a balancing of social interests, we should, at all times, bear
in mind that despite the annoyance and inconveniences caused, and
the bad taste often exhibited, by modern newspaper technique, the
freedom of the press is still the greatest safeguard of free institutions.50 We should, therefore, leave unheeded the appeals of those
who would encroach upon this great American fundamental. 51
50 See Lois G. Forer, A Free Press and A Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J., 800, (1953);
Edwin M. Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press, 39 A.B.A.J., 978, (1953);
Edwin M. Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press, 37 Am. JUD. Soc. 75,
(1953); Elisha Hanson, A Free Press and An Independent Judiciary, 41
Ai. JUD. Soc. 217, (1955); George H. Boldt, Should Canon 35 Be Anended?
41 A.B.A.J. 55, (1955) ; Jerry Walker, A Significant Point in Bar-Press

Debate, December 4, 1954,

EDITOR

&

PUBLISHER,

Vol. 87, No. 50, p. 10;

Dwight Bentel, Survey Reports Public Cold to Free Press, December 25,
1954, EDITOR & PULISHER, Vol. 87, No. 53, p. 12. Attempts to control publication by rule of court may infringe the freedom of the press: See, Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, 510, (1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 912. And the exercise of the inherent power to punish for
contempt is restricted by the application of the "clear and present danger"
concept: Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, (1941); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, (1946); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, (1947); Turkington v. Municipal Court, 85 C.A.2d
631, 193 P.2d 795, (1948); Kirkham v. Sweetring, 108 Utah 379, 160 P.2d
435, (1945). In the last analysis, the solution lies in that voluntary restraint
which is the most fruitful and permanent cure for abuse of democratic
rights. The New York Times summed up the problem in an editorial entitled
"Trial by Newspaper" in its issue of May 14, 1954:
"Officials and lawyers have a right and a duty, in the public interest, to
impose self-restraints that will protect civil liberties and fair trial.
They are thus censoring themselves. The newspapers have an obligation,
likewise in the public interest, to accept the consequences of this act of
conscience." (as quoted in NEw YoRm STATE BAR JouuRAL, Vol. 26, No. 4,
July 1954, p. 220)
51A leading newspaper editor has stated the need for adjusting the apparent
conflict between the right to a fair trial and freedom of the press in this
manner:
"How best assure that the press will go on playing the part it has played
-to its everlasting credit-in helping promote justice, while eliminating
abuses which inflame public opinion and create prejudgments of guilt
or innocence? Newspapers themselves must establish this balance beyond
question if they expect to remain altogether free. "There are not many
editors who do not recognize the nature of the conflict; few but can
decide where full and objective reporting leaves off and the abuses that
hinder a fair trial begin. And surely such professional newspaper groups
as the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Sigma Delta Chi, and
others ought to take the lead in promoting the kind of code that will
reconcile these conflicts. "To assure the public full information about
affairs, to prevent the suppression of individual rights which secrecy
and censorship make possible, the press is free. It should remain so.
If, however, even a few newspapers abuse this freedom the courts and,
if need be, the legislatures, will impose restrictions. For it never was
intended that freedom of the press should give newspapers license to
cripple the right of every man to a fair trial." (John M. Harrison, Associate Editor of the Toledo Blade in the "Press v. The Courts," in Saturday
Review, Vol. 38, No. 42, October 15, 1955, p. 9, 35. See Jerome H. Springarn,
"Newspapers and the Pursuit of Justice," Saturday Review, Vol. 26, No.
14, April 3, 1954, p. 9; Eustace Cullinan, The Right of Newspapers: May
They Print Whatever They Choose, A.B.A.J. Vol. 41, No. 11, November
1955, p. 1020)
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IV
HEARINGS

OTHER THAN

JUDICIAL

A. Recent Trends Towards Secrecy. The numerous attempts
made at all governmental levels from heads of villages to legislative
departments in the states and from low-ranking local heads of federal
bureaus to the policy-making executives of the federal government in
Washington, to draw arbitrarily, the curtain of secrecy around governmental activities are matters of common knowledge. In recent
years the press has referred constantly to incidents of such character.
In October of 1951, the members of a Northwestern University Forum,
representing newspapers of the Americas, declared that the integrity
of the freedom of information goes to the very roots of popular government in the United States and that this right was being,
".... steadily undermined by the growing practice of secrecy in

government on national, state and local levels; the growing
tendency of public officials to feel that they are not accountable
to the public; that they may conduct the business of their offices
in secret; that they may seal or impound public records; that
they may divulge only such information as they think is good
for the people to know; that they may extend 'military security'
into areas
of news which have no bearing on the nation's
'5 2
security.

Some more recent occurrences may be referred to. The American
Civil Liberties Union, in August of 1955, announced that it had begun
a study of government news policies to
"..

. spotlight areas where the press and other mass media

have expressed difficulty in obtaining information." 53

A Government Operations subcommittee of the House of Representatives headed by Representative John E. Moss, Jr. of California
last year began investigation of Government information policies and
practices. The hearings held disclosed some extra-ordinary practices.
The Post Office Department and Civil Service Commission labeled
as secret the names of men found to be eligible for post master. The
Civil Service Commission also claimed the inherent right to protect
itself by withholding information. It insisted that as its actions have
not been made public since 1863, the policy of secrecy had become
Vol. 84, No. 41, October 6, 1951, p. 10 cited by the
writer
in
book
review,
48 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REV., p. 527.
53
United Press Dispatch from Washington August 29, 1955, published in St.
Louis Post Dispatch August 29, 1955, p. 3B.
"Access to government news by the mass media of communication," said
Executive Director Malin in announcing the study, "is the heart of
democratic government. Our democracy depends on an informed public
opinion, by which the public may judge for itself the merits of various
social issues and the performance of government leaders. "(CIVIL LMER52

EDITOR & PUBLISHER,

TIES, No. 134, September 1955, p. 2)
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permanent as it were. The Treasury Department kept secret the
applications of organizations for exemption from taxation. The Department of Agriculture claimed the right to delay public information
of changes in interest rates in commodity loans. Many agencies enforce
secrecy by labeling information "for staff use only" or "administratively confidential."
At the conclusion of these hearings Representative Moss was
quoted as stating that the claim of inherent power to keep information
from the public was "a fantastical concept of law."54 Even the easing
of some of the restrictions has helped stress the extent of the secrecy.
On August 22, 1955, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, in a
Washington statement carried by all the news agencies, announced
that the Government had released 961 secret or restricted reports on
atomic energy research. The conservative Los Angeles Times concluded an editorial lead on the event in this manner:
& PUBLISHER, Vol. 88, No. 48, November 19, 1955, p. 13. For other
articles relating to the study see EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 88, No. 45, October

54 EDITOR

29, 1955, p. 10; id. No. 47, November 12, 1955, p. 10-11; id. No. 48, November

19, 1955, p. 13; id. No. 49, November 26, 1955, p. 9; CONG. REc., 84th Cong.

1st Sess., Aug. 2, 1955, pp. 1-2.
Newsmen and high government officials alike have sensed the danger as
the following expressions indicate:
"Many of us in government are concerned about the increasing difficulty
of finding out what is going on in government. The marble curtain that
has gradually been built between the newsmen and the government in

Washington shuts out all the public from what is rightly the public's
business." (Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senator from Minnesota, as quoted in EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 88, No. 43, October 15,
1955, p.7 .)
Another Senator has denounced the practice as "the silent curtain of beaurocratic censorship." (Stuart Symington, United States Senator from Missouri,
as quoted in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 13, 1955, p. 3A, Col. 1)
"It's high time that the people learned that for the first time in our
national history we have saddled onto the civilian branches of government
powers of regulating news heretofor held only by the military in times
of war. The government calls it power of classification. Classification,
nuts! That's merely a pretty word for censorship." (Norman E. Isaacs,
managing editor of Louisville (Ky.) Times, in address at Southwest
Journalism Forum, as quoted in EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 88, No. 43,
October 15, 1955, p. 7)
The Associated Press Managing Editors Association at its 22nd annual
meeting held in October 1955 adopted a resolution which in part stated:
"The Associated Press Managing Editors Assn., here assembled in convention condemns governmental secrecy that is withholding from American citizens facts about their own government that they are entitled to
know." . . .

"The association expressly condemns the withholding of informati6n that
has not been classified and that is not eligible for classifying on the
pretext that it is not 'constructive' or on the excuse that even though
it is non-security information it might be of 'possible use' to a potential
enemy. It deplores the operations and philosophy of the Office of Strategic
Information, the Sept. 15 defense establishment rules for private defense
contractors, the secrecy rules of the ODM's Operation Alert, the un-

announced invocation of wartime secrecy rules by the Strategic Air Command, and similar abuses of authority." (EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 88,
No. 49, November 26, 1955, p. 9 at p. 72)
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"These are the signs: hopeful and pleasant."5' 5
The release of this classified material followed the disclosure made at
the international scientific conference held in Geneva in August, 1955,
that scientists of countries which have advanced in the nuclear field
had, independent of one another, arrived at identical conclusions,
working independently from data known to all the scientific world.
A leading English newspaper made this editorial comment:
"In many ways the most important thing that has happened at
Geneva is the practical and public demonstration which has
been given of the absurdity of secrecy in matters of what used to
be called natural philosophy. In this country, the United States,
and Russia the painstaking activities of the scientists have
resulted in three identical pictures of the way in which atomic
fission works. No politician will ever again find much support
for the argument that the properties of atoms change with the
colour on a map, and that information of
a scientific kind can
56
be 'classified' by administrative action."
55 Los Angeles Times, September 10, 1955, editorial "It Has Saved More Than
It Killed." In the light of later events the tone of the editorial appears
rather too optimistic. A United States Senator, Clinton Anderson of New
Mexico, who heads the joint Senate-House Atomic Committee complained
later in the year that the Atomic Energy Commission kept him and members
of his committee from visiting certain areas in the commission's laboratory
at Los Alamos, New Mexico. This, despite the fact that this committee was
established by the Congress to keep in touch with the development of the
atomic project. Speaking before the Nuclear Science and Engineering Congress at Cleveland, Ohio, the Senator was quoted as saying:
"The atomic energy law says that the commission shall keep the joint
committee informed of all devleopments," . . . "but they thought that this
was so secret a project, that the joint committee should not be told about
it." (Associated Press dispatch in Los Angeles Mirror-News, Friday,
December 16, 1955, Part I, page 8)
56 Manchester Guardian Weekly, August 25, 1955, editorial lead, "Atoms For
All." The same newspaper in a story by its Parliamentary correspondent
dealing with the debate in the English Parliament on a proposal for an
inquiry into the English security services wrote:
"Nothing was more instructive in the debate than the unanimity with
which the House sided with the Prime Minister and Mr. Macmillan in
their warning that the search for security against Communist spying
must not betray us into encroachments on the freedom of the individual
under the law. 'Never,' declared Sir Anthony impressively, 'would I be
Prime Minister of a Government that sought powers to detain on suspicion
or hold a man until evidence could be gathered against him.' They were
his final words in the debate, and they won general applause." (Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vol. 73, No. 20, November 17, 1955, p. 2)
True to their tradition the English press and the English party leaders are
unwilling to surrender the safeguards of freedom and to promulgate rules
which would substitute suspicion for proof of guilt even in the realm of
national security.
A former member of the office of the General Counsel of the Atomic
Energy Commission expressed the view in 1953 that the unquestioned control
over information exercised by that Commission implied a surrender of
democratic rights, without reserving the all-important right to periodically
question and re-examine:
. . . While there are genuinely new problems posed by atomic secrecy,
and occasions where departures from precedent in coping with them are
justified and important, these problems and these occasions are identified
by an open-minded examination, not by a blanket assumption or a defini-
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B. Protecting the Right to Information. The present Chief
Justice of the United States, when he was Governor of California, in
a public address, deplored the tendency to restrict information about
governmental activities:
"There is a tendency on all levels of government to withhold
information from the public because it might be embarrassing.
I have found it necessary to fight the trend in my own state
administration. It is the duty of every public executive to do
the same thing." 57
As a result of widespread agitation, California, in 1953, enacted a
statute reading:
"All meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be
open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend
any meetings of the legislative body of a local agency, except as
otherwise provided in this chapter."58
In enacting this statute the legislature made the following significant
statements of policy:
tion. The proper response to the position that atomic secrets merit unique
protection is not a denial but a series of questions and a demand to be
shown.
"This analysis suggests that the significance of the atomic secrecy experience can be defined in rather basic and inclusive terms. The atom and its

secrets led to the temporary capitulation of a democratic society to the

apparent demands of an apparently important subject. In the process,
that society failed to reserve to itself the capability of putting any
departures from custom, which it imaginatively decided to make, to the
irreverent test of justifying themselves in operation. It is by this process,
in the past, that the most unknown and frightening subjects have been
made familiar and have been effectively assimilated. In the complicated
present, we should do well to remember and apply this great resource
of a free society." (John G. Palfrey, The Problem of Secrecy, ANN.

AM. A. POL. & Soc. Sci., Vol. 290, November 1953, p. 99)

See, Robert

A. Dahl, Atomic Energy and the Democratic Process, Ibid., pp. 1-6.
Preoccupation with security has become so important a part of the world
of today that Bertrand de Jouvenel divides modem governments into libertarian and securitarian. (Bertrand de Jouvenel, 1945, Du PouvwoR, ch.

XVIII, pp. 504 et seq.) However, much of what is done in the realm of
security is illusory in results and may have a stultifying influence on democratic life.
A noted scientist, Dr. Ralph E. Lappe, stated the lesson of the Atoms for

Peace Conference of 1955:

"We now know beyond all doubt that we have been following a selfdeceiving policy in much of our secrecy on the atom. Our secrets have
been betrayed, not by men, but by Dame Nature, that facile dispenser of
truth. Secrets, even legitimate ones, cannot be kept for long." (Bulletin

57

of Atomic Scientists, October 1955, as quoted in a St. Louis Post-Dispatch
editorial, "Progress on Atoms for Peace," October 10, 1955) (Emphasis
added)
See, John Lord O'Brian, NATIONAL SECrrUTY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, 1955.
From a speech by Governor Earl Warren given to the Press Club in Oregon,

as quoted in REPORT OF CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY ON
A.B. No. 339 (1953 Reg. Session) p. 13.
58 CAL. GOVT. CODE, §54953. In 1955 Ohio extended the scope of its present
law governing state agencies by prohibiting closed meetings by boards of education, boards of county commissioners and appointive agencies, commissions

and boards of local governments, and specifically forbidding the adoption of
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"In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that
the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public
agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's
business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken
openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
"The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority,
do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good
for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.
The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain
control over the instruments they have created."5 9
Many states have inspection statutes. California's is very broad:
"Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any
public writing of ' 60this state, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.

A related provision makes all public records and other matters in
the office of any officer open to inspection at all times during office
hours."' By another, a public officer having the custody of public
writings is bound to give, on demand, to any person a certified copy
of it on payment of the legal fees. 62 Wisconsin has a similar statute:
"18.01 .

. .

. (2) Except as expressly provided otherwise, any

person may with proper care, during office hours and subject to
such orders or regulations as the custodian thereof may prescribe, examine or copy any of the property or things mentioned
in subsection (1) ."63
A general California statute declares all the written acts and
records
"....

of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals,

and of public officers, legislative, judicial, and executive, whether
of this state, of the United States, of a sister state, or of a
foreign country;"
to be public writings. So are also "public records," kept in the state,
resolutions or the taking of formal action in executive sessions. Because of
its significance, the statute is given in its entirety:
"All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority
and all meetings of any board, commission, agency or authority of any
county, township, municipal corporation, school district or other political
subdivision are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all

times. No resolution, rule, regulation or formal action of any kind shall

be adopted at any executive session of any such board, commission, agency

or authority. "The minutes of a regular or special session or meeting of

any such board, commission, agency or authority shall be promptly recorded and such records shall be open to public inspection." (BALDWIN'S
OrIo REv. CODE Supp. (1955) §121.22.)
Proceedings as to parole and pardon are exempt from the provisions of the
act.
59 CAL. GOVT CODE, §54950.
60 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC., §1892.
61

CAL. Gov'T CODE, §1227.

62 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC., §1893.
63 WIs. STATS. (1953)
§18.01.
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"of private writings."'
A separate provision defines specifically as
"public writings," the following: laws, judicial records, other official
documents and public records of private writings, kept in the state. 6
Having made so broad a declaration of policy, and given the right to
copy any official document, any exemption would, of necessity, have
to be governed by special statutory exemptions. The most important
of these relate to taxation. The Code declares that all information
and records acquired by the state controller and'any of his employees,
relating to inheritance taxes, are confidential and forbids their dis6
closure. ,
However, the controller may allow local, state or federal officials,
charged with administration of any tax law, to examine his gift tax
67
records under proper regulations.
Other statutes allow school districts to make rules for the physical
examinations of pupils in the public schools and to insure their secrecy
in connection with any defect disclosed by any such examination;8
make the records of the social welfare department, relating to needy
children and the aged, confidential, and forbid disclosure of any lists
of persons receiving public assistance.6 9 A general statute prohibits an
officer of the State from divulging any information acquired by him
from the private books, documents or papers of any persons, and
conducting any investigation on behalf of any state department, to
any person other than the head of his department, or when called
upon to testify in any court or legal proceeding. 70
Wisconsin has similar statutes relating to income tax and gift tax
returns, which forbid divulging information for compensation, but
allow newspapers to publish such information and public speakers to
use them in public speeches. 71 Wisconsin also closes certain matters
relating to mental health ;72 congenital deformities ;73 physicians' report
on tuberculosis ;74 and venereal diseases ;75 permits the impounding of
records in divorce cases ;76 closes proceedings before magistrates, so
called "John Doe proceedings," investigating the commission of an
offense before a warrant is issued.7 7 It also forbids the identification,
64 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC., §1888.
65 CAL. CODE: CIV. PROC., §1894.
66 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE, §16563.
67 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE, §16564.
68 CAL. ED. CODE, §16482.
69 CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE, §118.
70
CAL. GOV'T CODE, §11182.
71
Wis. STATS., (1953), §71.11 (44).
72 WIs. STATS., (1953), §51.30.
73
WIS. STATS., (1953), §69.32.
74
WIS. STATS., (1953), §143.06.
75 WIS. STATS., (1953), §143.07.
76 WIS. STATS., (1953), §247.19.
77 WIS. STATS., (1953), §354.025.
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orally or in the press, of victims7 in cases involving rape, sodomy and
other sex crimes against minors.
What precedes indicates that the difficulty lies not so much with
governments, state or federal, but with those who administer their
agencies. While as to legislative and administrative hearings the
guaranty of access is not so broad, as in the case of judicial hearings,
nevertheless, it does exist. It is the disregard of the law by the
agencies exercising the various activities that is responsible for the
agitation seeking, either through additional legislation or through the
coercive power of public opinion, to permit full disclosure.
C. The Privilege of Reports of Public Meetings. Freedom of
79
assembly is guaranteed both by the federal government and the states.
Nevertheless, the courts, while stating that the newspapers may publish
accounts of such meetings, have held them responsible for repeating
libelous charges made at any such meetings.80 Only three states, Cali78 Wis. STATS.,

(1953), §348.412.

79 U.S. Const. Amend. I;

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION Art. I, §10; WISCONSIN
Art. I, §4.
S0Jackson v. Record Pub. Co., 175 S.C. 211, 178 S.E. 833, (1935). This case
states the principle in this manner:
"A newspaper is privileged to publish accounts of a public meeting,
provided such publication does not contain charges or statements, made by
the paper, or a third person, which impute to another the commission of
a crime or of acts which will bring him into contempt and ridicule of
the public, and cause him to incur its hatred, or which will injure him in
his business or calling, or which are false and malicious." (p. 835)
However, in the particular instance, the court held that because the article
was the report of speeches of candidates for public office, it was privileged,
saying:
"We think the publication falls within the class of quasi privileged communications, inasmuch as it relates to the candidacy of one who is seeking
public office." (p. 837)
See, Boehmer v. Detroit Free Press Co., 94 Mich. 7, 53 N.W. 822, (1892).
81 CAL. CIv. CODE, §47, subd. 5; VERNON'S TEXAS CIv. STAT., 1948, Art. 5432,
subd. 3 and 5; UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, §45-2-3(5). The Texas statute
is broader than California's. It does not contain the qualification "without
malice" and reads:
"3. A fair, true and impartial account of the proceedings of public meetings, dealing with public purposes, including a fair, true and impartial
account of statements and discussion in such meetings, and of other
matters of public concern, transpiring and uttered at such public meetings."
However, when the matter ceases to be of public concern, republication is
not protected:
"5. The privilege provided under Section 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this article
shall extend to any first publication of such privileged matter by any
newspaper or periodical, and to subsequent publications thereof by it when
published as a matter of public concern for general information; but any
republication of such privileged matter, after the same has ceased to be
a matter of such public concern, shall not be deemed privileged, and may
be made the basis of an action for libel upon proof that such matter has
ceased to be of such public concern and that same was published with
actual malice."
The language of the Utah provision is almost identical with that of California,
and reads:
"A privileged publication which shall not be considered as libelous per
se is one made: . . . (5) by fair and true report without malice of a
proceeding of a public meeting if such meeting was lawfully convened
CONSTITUTION,

1956]

THE RIGHT TO KNOW

fornia, Texas and Utah, protect newspapers by declaring fair and
true reports of the proceedings of a public meeting privileged,"'
although a provision of this character has been a part of the law of
England since 1888.2

Under the English provision, as interpreted by the courts, it is not
sufficient that the meeting be for the public benefit, and that the proceedings and speeches, on the whole, also be for public benefit. It must
be shown also that the publication of the particular matter complained
of was for the public benefit.8 3
The California provision is broader and the requirement that the
publication of the matter complained of be for the public benefit is
an alternative one. The privilege would seem to attach to reports of
meetings, provided they are public, whether their proceedings or
speeches be for the public benefit or not. More, if the publication of
the matter be for the public benefit, the privilege would attach even
though some of the requirements as to the nature of the public meeting, such as the lawfulness of its purpose be absent.
The criteria by which the fairness of reports of public meetings
is judged are, in the main, the same as those by which fairness of
reports of judicial, legislative or other offcial proceedings is determined. Fairness is absent when the report contains fragmentary or
incomplete parts of the proceedings which do not constitute an accurate
summary of the whole. Thus, in a prosecution for criminal libel,the publication of a false oath attributed to the Knights of Columbus,-to the argument that the oath published was a part of the Congressional Record and that it was, therefore, a fair report of a legislative
proceeding under the law of California, the Court's answer was:
"This section, (PENAL CODE, §254) however, does not afford
immunity to one who has willfully and maliciously distorted
a statement found in a legislative ,publication by intentionally
publishing fragmentary and incomplete parts thereof which
do not indicate a fair summary of the whole proceedings. Here
there was a clear intimation that the publication was stamped
with the approval of the congressional committee at Washington, no mention being made of the circumstances under which
it was printed or that the committee found that the oath was
false." 4
for a lawful purpose and open to the public or the publication of the
matter complained of was for the public benefit."
See Wason v. Walker, L.R. (1868) 4 Q.B. 73.
as to newspaper immunity for publication of parliamentary proceedings.
83 GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, (4th ed.) p. 329; Kelly v. O'Malley, 6
TIMEs LAW REP. 248, (1889); Sharman v. Merritt, 32 TIMEs LAW REP. 360,
(1916).
84 People v. Gordan, 63 C.A. 627, 635, 219 Pac. 486, (1923).
However, the
courts overlook unimportant inaccuracies. They do not exact perfection of
the reporter and will grant him the full benefit of the privilege if his report
is substantially correct.
82 51 and 52 Vict., ch. 64 (1888).
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V
THE FEDERAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

A. Protection of Defense Establishments. Any discussion of
the problem of access to government information must, of necessity,
deal with the problem of secrecy in government and, consequently,
with security. A discussion of the problems of security and loyalty
is beyond the scope of this study. 5 Suffice it to say that aside from
the large number of security regulations made by the various governmental agencies, the federal statutes other than the ATOMIC ENERGY
STATUTE, s6 protect the really vital defense information of the government against loss and against theft of material to aid foreign governments. Thus it is an offense to gather, transmit or lose defense information and to enter a military establishment or docks, canals,
As said by a California court in another case: .
"It is not the mere fact that a difference exists between the published
report of what the complaint in the proceeding charged and what was
actually alleged in the complaint, but rather is the difference of a substantial character and does it produce a different effect. It seems clear
that the published article was a fair and substantial account of the complaint written by a reporter and finally published without any unusual
circumstances obtaining." (Kurata v. L.A. News Pub. Co., 4 C.A.2d 224,
228, 40 P2d 530, 1935) And see note 32, supra.
On the whole, California courts take a liberal attitude in determining the
privileged character of reports of judicial proceeding. See, Glenn v. Gibson,
75 C.A.2d 649, 657-659, 17 P.2d 118, (1946).
ss See John Lord O'Brian, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, 1955;
Telford Taylor, GRAND INQUEST, 1955; Alan Barth, GOVERNMENT By INVESTIGATION, 1955. Internal Security and Civil Rights, ANN. AM. A. POL. & Soc.
Sci., edited by Thorsten Sellin, July 1955, Vol. 300, pp. 4 et seq. Osmond
K. Fraenkel, The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Criminal

Justice, in CIVIL

RIGHTS IN AMERICA,

edited by Robert K. Carr, Vol. 275,

ANN. AM. A. POL. & Soc. Sci., Vol. 275, p. 86. Harold D. Lasswell, Does
the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?, Ibid., p. 111; Eleanor Bontecou,
Does the Loyalty Program Threaten Civil Rights, Ibid., 117; Edward C.
Kirkland, Do Antisubversive Efforts Threaten Academic Freedcmf, Ibid.,
132. The Washington Post recently expressed the concern of many earnest
citizens over one of the most criticized features of the security investigation,
the Anomymity of the sources of derogation in an editorial which read,
in part:
"It is impossible to refute the charges of unknown accusers. Long ago in
ancient Athens, Socrates, on trial for his life, faced this situation and
uttered words which ought never to be forgotten:
'... These are the accusers whom I dread; for they are the circulators
of this rumor and their hearers are too apt to fancy that speculators of
this sort do not believe in the gods. And they are many, and their
charges against me are of ancient date ... And, hardest of all, their names
I do not know and cannot tell ... But the main body of these slanderers,
who from envy and malice have wrought upon you-and these are some
of them who are convinced themselves, and impart their convictions to
others, all these, I say, are most difficult to deal with: for I cannot have
them up here, and examine them, and therefore I inust simply fight with
shadows in ny own defense, and examine when there is no one who
answers . . .
(Emphasis added) (Washington Post, ed. "Fighting Against Shadows,"
January 16, 1956, p. 8).
See Yankwich, 1954, Some Challenges to Our Constitutional Ideals, 28 So.
CAL L. REV. 1, 10-16.
8642 U.S.C.A. §1801 et seq.
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factories or other installations for the purpose of obtaining information respecting national defense, with intent or reason to believe that
the information is being used to the injury of the United States or to
the advantage of any foreign nation.87 It is also made an offense to
gather or deliver defense information with intent or reason to believe
that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of a foreign government,--an offense which may be punished by twenty years imprisonment in peace-time or by thirty years
or death in war-time 88 Under this section, a former Navy yeoman
who stole a gunnery manual from a ship and delivered it to a Japanese
officer was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment
in my court in 1936. A conviction was had before another judge of
transmitting information to Russia. To the argument that the information was of a character not connected with national defense, the
court's answer is that this was a question of fact for the jury, saying:
"The function of the court is to instruct as to the kind of information which is violative of the statute, and of the jury to decide
whether the information secured is of the defined kind. It is
not the function of the court, where reasonable men may differ,
to determine whether the acts do or do not come within the
ambit of the statute. The question of the connection of the
information with national defense is a question of fact to be
determined by the jury as negligence upon undisputed facts
as determined."8' 9
Photographing and sketching a defense installation is punished9 0
So is the use of aircraft for photographing defense installations. 9
The publication and sale of photographs of defense installations is
also punishable. 92 The statute punishes very severely anyone who
harbors or conceals any person whom he knows or has reasonable
grounds to believe or suspect has commited an offense under sections
93
793 or 794 of the title.
These are but a few of the penal statutes which protect the defense
installations of the country. Of necessity they have led to security
measures by private employers, railroads and others who may be
doing work for the government, which affect thousands of establishments, and, perhaps, millions of persons. No one denies the need for
these precautions. And while some of the loyalty and security procedures have been attacked, there has been no criticism of these measures which cover serious violations of national security.
87 18 U.S.C.A. §793.
88 18 U.S.C.A. §794.
89 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 32, (1941).
90 18 U.S.C.A. §795.
9' 18 U.S.C.A. §796.

18 U.S.C.A. §797.
93 18 U.S.C.A. §792.
92
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B. The Right to Make Departmental Regulations. However,
severe criticism has been directed at the basic law which gives to
departmental heads of the federal government the right to make
regulations. The policy of the subject dates back to the beginning
of our government, a statute having been enacted as early as July 27,
1789. 9 4 The provision now reads:
"22. Departmental regulations. The head of each department
is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers
and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and
the custody, use; and preservation of the records, papers, and
property appertaining to it."95
Under the authority of this provision, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on April 15, 1898, with the approval of the Secretary of
State, promulgated a rule which forbade members of the department
to disclose to private persons or to local officers or to produce in state
courts, special tax records. When the constitutionality of this was
questioned the Supreme Court could see no constitutional infirmity in
the statute saying:
"Can it be said that to invest the Secretary of the Treasury with
authority to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with the law
for the conduct of the business of his Department, and to provide for the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers
and property appertaining to it, was not a means appropriate
and plainly adapted to the successful administration of the
affairs of that Department? Manifestly not. The bare statement
of the proposition suggests this conclusion, and extended argument to support it is unnecessary ....

Reasons of public policy

may well have suggested the necessity, in the interest of the
Government, of not allowing access to the records in the offices
of collectors of internal revenue, except as might be directed
by the Secretary of the Treasury. The interest of persons
compelled, under the revenue laws, to furnish information
as to their private business affairs would often be seriously
affected if the disclosures so made were not properly guarded.
Besides, great confusion might arise in the business of the Department if the Secretary allowed the use of records and papers
in the custody of collectors to depend upon the discretion or
judgment of subordinates. At any rate, the Secretary deemed
the regulation in question a wise and proper one, and we cannot
perceive that his action was beyond the authority conferred by
Congress." 9
The ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT recognizes the rule making

power of administrative agencies except to the extent that there is
94 1 STAT. 28.

9 5 U.S.C.A. §22.

9GBoske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-470, (1900).
in Toughy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 470-471, (1951).

This case was approved
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involved (1) any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the
United States or (2) any matter relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts,
and requires each agency to give public access to matters of official
record. The sole reservation in that respect is an exception about
"... information held confidential for good cause." 97
C. Beaurocratic Discretion? Newspapers insist that notwithstanding the right to judicial review sanctioned by the cases cited and
others,"
"The entrance gates to records are shut and guarded except on
those occasions when official grace is moved to set them ajar for
light and air. ' 99
A study of the cases indicates that the existence of judicial control
is sufficient guard against abuse of the power. Significant in this
respect is the language of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in condemning a government claim of total immunity to disclosure:
"Moreover we regard the recognition of such a sweeping privilege against any disclosure of the internal operations of the
executive departments of the Government as contrary to a sound
public policy. The present cases themselves indicate the breadth
of the claim of immunity for disclosue which one government
department head has already made. It is but a small step to
assert a privilege against any disclosure of records merely because they might prove embarrassing to government officers.
Indeed it requires no great flight of imagination to realize that
if the Government's contentions in these cases were affirmed
the privilege against disclosure might gradually be enlarged by
executive determinations until, as is the case in some nations
90 5

U.S.C.A., §1003, 1002. Cases decided both before and since the enactment

of this statute have sustained the departmental regulations when they do no
violence to other constitutional principles. Carter v. Forrestal, U.S.App.D.C.,
175 F.2d 364, 366, (1949) ; Cella v. United States, 208 F.2d 783, 788, (7th Cir.
1953). The view of the Courts is that administrative agencies
• . . should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to
pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties." (Federal Communication Commission v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143, 1910) ; McDonald v. Lee, 217 F.2d 619,

624-625, (5th Cir. 1954).
sUnited States ex rel v. Reagan, 340 U.S. 462, (1951); Reynolds v. United
States, 192 F.2d 987, (3rd Cir. 1951).
99 Harold L. Cross, THE PEOPLES RIGHT To KNow, 1953, p. 215. Speaking
before the Moss sub-committee, the author of this book called the provisions
9

of the

ADmINISTRATIVE

PRocaouaas Acr an "abject failure," as far as making

public records available is concerned. It allows *

• . . secrecy involving 'any function of the United StAtes requiring
secrecy in the public interest (not limited to national security)' and
involving 'any matter relating solely to the internal management of any
agency'...
'The public interest has always had a way of becoming identified with
the interest of whonever is making the determination." (United Press
dispatch, Washington, December 17, in New York Times, December 18,
1955, p. L 69)
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today, it embraced the whole range of governmental activities." 00
Grant that
"Public business is the public's business ;,,101

that the right to the free flow of information about such business is a
right of which each public official is a trustee and that the right to
refuse disclosure if carried to the extreme may breed tyranny. Nevertheless, on the federal level, it has Congressional sanction not only in
the section cited, (5 U.S.C.A., §22) but in others, which justify refusal of information even to other agencies,
"... when compliance will be injurous to the public interest."' 1 2
Frankly, I see no reason why the right of access should be made
absolute in all cases, without restriction. Even the great guarantees
of the First Amendment,-including the Freedom of the Press,--are
not absolute and uncontrollable. And so long as the refusal to grant
access to interested persons, including the public, is reviewable by
courts against abuse, I cannot see why the government cannot make
access dependent upon the wise discretion of the responsible heads
of the government.
At times, newspapers insist that all preliminary steps in an administrative, executive or legislative matter be thrown open to the
public. This would not always work in the public interest. The proceedings of parole or pardon boards might be greatly hampered if all
the steps before them were opened to the public. Indeed, many are
of the view that probation reports, which disclose the ground on which
probation is granted or denied, be not made public. The California
State Bar, in September, 1955, adopted a resolution urging the abolition of the present practice in California which makes probation reports open to the public,10 3 and substituting for it access only upon
Reynolds v. United States, supra, note 98, p. 995.
101 Cross, op. cit., Preface p. XIII.
102 28 U.S.C.A., §2507 provides that while the Court of Claims may call upon any
department or agency of the United States for information or papers it
needs, the head of any department or agency may refuse to comply when
"inhis opinion, compliance will be injurious to the public interest."
103 CAL. PENAL CODE, §1023. The editorial reaction of one California newspaper
was almost "violent." In a lead editorial entitled "More Light, Not Less" in
its issue of September 15, 1955, the Los Angeles Examiner wrote:
"The convention of the California State Bar Association in San Francisco,
by its adoption of a proposal to conceal probation reports filed with the
court in criminal cases from the public and the press, contribute to the
aggravation rather than the solution of the admittedly serious problems
of probation and parole.
"It does not solve any part of the crime problem to hide it in dark places.
"What is needed in the whole field of criminal study, and particularly
in the critical areas of probation and parole, is more light, not less.
"The only source of light is full access to the facts, and concealment of
the vital facts draws a curtain of darkness between the public and the
problem."
1oo
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order of the court. In my view, only documents which present ultimate
action should be open to the public. Those which are only part of the
preliminary steps by which the conclusion is reached should become
public only in the discretion of the particular agency, subject to judicial
review in proper cases.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In what precedes we have discussed the people's right to know
against the background of statutory and official enactments which may
or may not affect its exercise. It is apparent that the legal restrictions
upon the right are not great. 0 4 In the last analysis, the problem is,
as are many others in a democratic society, one of adjustment between
the government and the public.
We began this study by discussing human personality. So we must
equate the problem with it. Ours is a government by discussion. Its
strength lies in knowledge. As Madison stated:
"A popular government without popular information or the
means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy,
or perhaps both."'' 05
Our democratic society, derives its power from the people, and must
allow public access to all matters relating to the public's business. Only
in this manner can the public participate in government, respond
intelligently to its demands, and the right to comment on public men
and public matters,--so vital to the proper functioning of self-government by free men,--be exercised. Only as the press serves the public's
right to know assiduously
"... is freedom of the press important."' 106
See statutory and federal provisions in Cross, op. cit., pages 379 to 390.
1056 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1906, p. 398. Madison made this statement,
as chairman of the commission which drafted the first amendment. A modem
student of the problem has insisted that the right to free flow of information
should be recognized as a legal right:
"Self-government is possible only to the extent that the leaders of the
state are agents responsive to the will of the people. If the public opinion
which directs conduct of governmental affairs is to have any validity; if
the people are to be capable of real self-rule, access to all relevant facts
upon which rational judgments may be based must be provided. A thorough knowledge of official deportment is essential to protect the electorate
from inadvertently condoning the mistakes of those in power. The importance of freedom of information to a nation which professes selfgovernment lies in the fact that without one the other cannot truly exist.
"It is not enough merely to recognize the important political justification
from freedom of information. Citizens of a self-governing society must
possess the legal right to examine and investigate the conduct of its
affairs, subject only to those limitations imposed by the most urgent
public necessity. This right must be elevated to a position of highest
sanctity if it is to constitute an effective bulwark against unresponsive
leadership." (NOTE, Access to Official Information. A Neglected Con104

stitutional Right, 1952, 27 INDIANA LAW J. 209).
106 EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol. 87, No. 53, December 25, 1954, p. 12.
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To do so, the information secured should not be deliberately colored
in transmittal or suppressed entirely. 107 Granted the public's right to
access to all that concern's the public's business, considerations of wise
public policy should determine its exercise. Administrators and men
who run newspapers are instruments of government'" But both are
human. And we are back to the responsibility of the "I and thou"
(le moi et l'autre) of which Gabriel Marcel speaks and which we
quoted at the beginning. Secrecy as such cannot be tolerated if the
democratic process is to survive.
"All governments," wrote Lord Acton, "in
which one principle
10 9
dominates, degenerate by exaggeration.'

A government in which secrecy is dominant would cease to be responsive to the people. To avoid this, the demands of the public for
107A

FREE AND RESPONSmLE PRESS 59-65

(1947).

Some newspaper editors

insist that "slanting" is legitimate and that
"... complete objectivity in news presentation has never been attained
in any newspaper and never will be attained in anything save stock tables
and similar tabulations." (Hamilton Ownes, Editor-in-Chief of Baltimore
Sun papers, in address before the University of Virginia's Institute of
Public Affairs, July 10, 1953, as reprinted in EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Vol.
86, No. 30, July 18, 1953, pp. 12, 48). Very candidly, he added: "No
human being is wholly objective and newspaper men from the cub reporter through the copy reader to the editor and publisher are all too
human." (Id. at 48)
A noted Wisconsin editor has stated that the Washington correspondents of
the metropolitan newspapers of the country, in dealing with the problem of
governmental secrecy "no longer work hard to develop the expose type of
story." (William T. Evjue, of the Madison, Wis. Capital Times, in a radio
talk as quoted in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, editorial page, October 18,
1955).
108 C. P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, May 5, 1921, when that
English newspaper celebrated its centenary as a newspaper, wrote:
"A newspaper has two sides to it. It is a business, like any other, and
has to pay in the material sense in order to live. But it is much more
than a business; it is an institution; it reflects and it influences the life
of a whole community; it may affect even wider destinies. It is, in its
way, an instrument of government. It plays on the minds and consciences
of men. It may educate, stimulate, assist, or it may do the opposite. It
has, therefore, a moral as well as a material existence, and its character
and influence are in the main determined by the balance of these two
forces. It may make profit or power its first object, or it may conceive
itself as fulfilling a higher and more exacting function." (As reprinted in
Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 7, 1955, p. 7). (Emphasis added)
109Lord Acton, "The Civil War in America," in HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND
STUDIES, (1907 ed.) by Figgis and Warren, p. 133. In one of his famous
letters to the Rambler dated January 23, 1861 in stressing the need for what
he called ventilation of social questions "interesting to all alike," Lord Acton
wrote:
"But it must be established that all questions of this kind, not exclusively
ecclesiastical, but social and interesting to all alike, require ventilation (1)
for the enlightenment of those whose business practically it is to decide
about them; (2) for the satisfaction of others and for inspiring them
with confidence, giving security, etc.
"Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice;
nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity. The Church especially has been in the habit of appealing to the
sense of the masses, to public opinion, as she is founded on conscience."
(Letter LXXIV in Lord Acton and His Circle, ed. by Abbot Gasquet,
1906, p. 166).
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information as to its business must be met. Legal restrictions which
may impede access should be removed. But, ultimately, the problem
is one of responsibility. We should strive for a balance between the
needs of authority and liberty.
If those in public office arrogate to themselves the unrestricted
power to determine what information shall be made known to the
public, it would become too easy for them to conceal their conduct
and misconduct,--their deeds and misdeeds. Great harm can be done
to the democratic process if governmental activities are covered with
a mantle of secrecy. A cabinet officer has asserted the exclusive right
to determine whether the release of information concerning his department
".... is in the interest of the Government." 110
Another cabinet officer has directed that no news information to his
department be released unless
1
"... it is constructive."
This makes the officer whose department is subject to scrutiny the sole
judge as to the availability of information as to his official conduct
or that of his subordinates.
It enables the official to keep from the public the very acts which
may deserve the censure and criticism of the public, whose servant he
is. Such control by public officials over public disclosure of their own
activities might well lead the people, the ultimate judges or censors
of their performance, to ask despairingly, in Juvenal's words:
"Sed quis cutodiet ipsos custodes ?"
(Who is to guard the guards themselves?)
In view of the absolute protection which the law attaches to utterances made and acts done in the course of judicial, legislative and
executive proceedings"12 and the qualified privilege which attaches to
what is done even by the most inferior of public agencies," 3 the un110

Secretary of Agriculture Ezra T. Benson as quoted in an article entitled
"Taking Away Your Right to Know" reproduced from Labor in The Fresno
Bee, September 24, 1955, p. 12B.

""x Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson as quoted in the same article. Rightly
did James S. Polk, Editor of the Louisville Courier & Times, insist that the
order would

"... wipe out the public right to knowledge of public business."
Pertinently, as though bringing Juvenal up to date, he asked:
"When the men whose action, ideas and failures we should know about
are deciding what is 'constructive,' where are we?"
Ibid.
-11233 Am. JuR., LIBEL AND SLANDER, §§140-143, 146-152; 53 C.J.S., LIBEL AND
SLANDER, §§102-105; Yankvich, Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its
Origh, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. p. 259, (1951). Yankwich,
It's Libel or Contempt If You Print It, pp. 291-297, (1950); PROSSER ON
TORTS, pp. 611-612, (2nd ed. 1955), RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§585, 590, 591.
11333 AM. Jui., LiBEL AND SLANDER, §144; 53 C.J.S., LIBEL AND SLANDER, §129;
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limited power to withhold information creates an anomaly: The
public official enjoys immunity from legal liability to others for his
official acts. If he can cover his acts with the cloak of secrecy, he is
relieved of the only restraint remaining,-responsibility to the public
for his acts. Secrecy, therefore, breeds irresponsibility as well as
tyranny. By contrast, a generous policy of access, denied only in case
of extreme governmental necessity, avoids these evils and is more
compatible with democratic ideals.
As accurate reporting of governmental activities is protected by
qualified privilege, a liberal rule of access and competition between
the news-gathering agencies would tend to encourage the widest dissemination of governmental information.1 14
In brief, if public officials and the organs of information act with
full awareness of their moral obligation and responsibility to a democratic society, they will perform truly their essential function as
instruments of free government.,15
PROSSER, op. cit., supra, note 112, p. 612; Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 485,
62 N.W.2d 222, (1954). Annotation, 40 A.L.R.2d 933, 941.
Kent Cooper, former executive director of the Associated Press, some years
ago, summed up the two facets of the problem when he stated that the
citizen's right to know was essential to political freedom, and that it implies
"... access to news, fully and accurately presented." (as quoted in New
York Times, Sunday, September 18, 1955, p. 59).
This means that in order that the right to know be given true scope, access
by the media of communication must be followed by full and accurate communication to the public of the information secured.
I15 The convention of Liberty of Information adopted by the Conference of the
United Nations in 1950, declared in its preamble that
"... the free exchange of information is one of man's fundamental rights,
essential to the cause of peace and to progress in the political, social and
economic fields"
and bound the members who should adhere to it to guarantee
" . . . freedom to transmit and receive information."
(Quoted in Jacques Bourquin, 1950, LA LIBERTi DE LA PREssE, p. 570; for
the author's comments on the project, see pp. 137-150).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10,
1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations in asserting the right to
freedom of opinion and expression declares it to include the freedom
". .. to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers." (Art. 19)
(See, HUMAN RIGHTS: A UNESCO Symposium, 1949, Appendix III, p. 277.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATIONS 3381, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
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AND CONFERENCE SERIs . . . 20, January 1949)

A Committee of the National Catholic Welfare Conference on February 1,
1947, sent to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights a "Declaration
of Human Rights" which declared among "rights which are inalienable,"
". . . the right to freedom of expression, of information and of communication in accordance with truth and justice." (Part I (6)) (As
quoted in New York Times, February 2, 1947, p. 4(L); Catholic Action,
February 1947, pp. 4-5, 17)
A French writer has summed up the democratic implications of the recognition of the right to free flow of information in these words:
"Thus in a democracy there is a recognized judge of the individual's
responsibility in the expression of his views. To be a democrat is to
acknowledge that judge.
"Admittedly, as no one can be fully a democrat save in a democracy
already achieved, and as there are only imperfect potential democracies,
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it is at all times the citizen's right-and even his duty-to judge his
judge. It is the fear of that ultimate appeal which holds back the steps
of majorities along the path of tyranny....
Doubtless in such an appeal
ad infinitum, where rules and safeguards successively pass away, there
are growing risks of errors. But is there any liberty without risk.
Risk abides in the heart of man, for man exists only by inventing himself." (Ren6 Maheu, op. cit., supra, note 2, pp. 218, 222) (Emphasis
added)
In the last analysis the problem like all problems relating to freedom in
modern society is one of accommodation. A modern student has stated the
problem in this manner:
"Whether pluralism continues in these countries or not will largely depend
on how the three problems of accommodation, progress, and liberty, which
have been the burden of this paper, continue to be handled; and a pluralistic system offers the best available compromise between the oft-conflicting demands of order on the one hand and liberty on the other. The
answer lies in the responsibility of private association and the wisdom
of the law. The absolutism of the state can be avoided through strong
and responsible associations; the absolutism of the private group through
strong individuals properly protected in the exercise of their independence." (Clark Kerr, Industrial Relations and the Liberal Pluralist, Reprint #80, INSTTUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, p. 15, 1955).

